A well-known attack on RSA with low secret-exponent d was given by Wiener about 15 years ago. Wiener showed that using continued fractions, one can efficiently recover the secret-exponent d from the public key (N, e) as long as d < N 1/4 . Interestingly, Wiener stated that his attack may sometimes also work when d is slightly larger than N 1/4 . This raises the question of how much larger d can be: could the attack work with non-negligible probability for d = N 1/4+ρ for some constant ρ > 0? We answer this question in the negative by proving a converse to Wiener's result. Our result shows that, for any fixed > 0 and all sufficiently large modulus lengths, Wiener's attack succeeds with negligible probability over a random choice of d < N δ (in an interval of size Ω(N δ )) as soon as δ > 1/4 + . Thus Wiener's success bound d < N 1/4 for his algorithm is essentially tight. We also obtain a converse result for a natural class of extensions of the Wiener attack, which are guaranteed to succeed even when δ > 1/4. The known attacks in this class (by Verheul and Van Tilborg and Dujella) run in exponential time, so it is natural to ask whether there exists an attack in this class with subexponential run-time. Our second converse result answers this question also in the negative.
Introduction
The RSA public-key cryptosystem is one of the most popular systems in use today. Accordingly, the study of the security of special variants of RSA designed for computational efficiency is a major area of research. One natural RSA variant which is attractive for speeding up secret operations (signature generation or decryption) is Low Secret-Exponent RSA. In this variant the RSA secret exponent d is chosen to be small compared to the RSA modulus N . A well-known attack on RSA with low secret-exponent d was given by Wiener [10] about 15 years ago. Wiener showed that using continued fractions, one can efficiently recover the secret-exponent d from the public key (N, e) as long as d < N 1/4 . Interestingly, Wiener stated that his attack may sometimes also work when d is slightly larger than N 1/4 . This raises the question of how much larger d can be: could the attack work with non-negligible probability for d = N 1/4+ρ for some constant ρ > 0?
In this paper, we answer the above question in the negative by proving a converse to Wiener's result. Our result shows that, for any fixed > 0 and all sufficiently large modulus lengths, Wiener's attack succeeds with negligible probability over a random choice of d < N δ (in an interval of size Ω(N δ )) as soon as δ > 1/4 + . Thus Wiener's bound d < N 1/4 for his attack is essentially tight. We also obtain a converse result for a natural class of extensions of the Wiener attack, which are guaranteed to succeed even when δ > 1/4. The known attacks in this class (by Verheul and Van Tilborg [8] and Dujella [3] ) run in exponential time, so it is natural to ask whether there exists an attack in this class with subexponential run-time. Our second converse result answers this question also in the negative.
Related Work. To our knowledge, the converse results in this paper provide the first proven evidence for the limitations of the Wiener attack [10] and its extensions by Verheul and Van Tilborg [8] and Duejlla [3] . Essentially, our results prove that when δ > 1/4, the linear equation (satisfied by the secret key) which is exploited by the Wiener attack cannot lead by itself to a key-recovery attack which runs in subexponential time (because there are too many solutions). In order to obtain a subexponential attack when δ > 1/4 one must exploit some other property of the secret key. Indeed, the lattice-based Boneh-Durfee attack [2] and its variant given by Blömer and May [1] , exploit a non-linear equation satisfied by the secret key, which gives an attack that heuristically succeeds in polynomial-time when δ < 0.292. Finding proven limitations on the Boneh-Durfee attack and its variants is currently an open problem, but we believe our results on provable limitations of the Wiener attack are a first step in this direction.
Organization of This Paper. Section 2 presents definitions and known results from number theory that we use. In Section 3, we define the standard RSA key-generation algorithm that our results apply to and review Wiener's result. In Section 4, we state and prove our converse to Wiener's result. In Section 5, we present our generalized converse result which applies to a natural class of extensions of the Wiener attack. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Continued Fractions
Here we collect several known results that we use about continued fractions, which can be found in [5, 6] .
For positive integers a 1 , . . . , a n , we define the rational number
For brevity, we write x = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), and we call the sequence (a 1 , . . . , a n ) a continued fraction expansion of length n for x. Theorem 2.1 (Continued Fractions). Let x = r s for positive integers r, s with gcd(r, s) = 1 and r < s. Then the rational x has a unique continued fraction expansion x = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) with a n > 1, which can be computed in time O(log 2 s) by the following algorithm:
Compute iteratively
Let (a 1 , . . . , a n ) denote the continued fraction expansion of rational x. For i = 1, . . . , n, the rationals
. . , a i ) are called the convergents of (the continued fraction expansion for) x. The convergents y i to x become successively closer to x with increasing index i until the last convergent y n which is equal to x. In this paper we assume the following natural key-generation algorithm RSAKG δ,β 1 ,β 2 ( ) for RSA, which would typically be used when the goal is to produce a modulus N in the order of 2 and a secret exponent d in the order of N δ for some fixed 0 < δ ≤ 1. The fixed real-valued parameters β 1 > 0 and β 2 > 0 control the size of the intervals from which the prime factors of N and the secret exponent d are chosen from (typically, we set β 1 = β 2 = 1, to fix a certain bit-length for p, q and d).
Theorem 2.2 (Convergents
All the probabilities computed in this paper are evaluated over the random choices of algorithm RSAKG δ,β 1 ,β 2 ( ).
1 Pick uniformly at random a prime p ∈ P /2,β 1 (Here P /2,β 1 denotes the set of all primes in the interval [2 /2−β 1 , 2 /2 ] and typically we set β 1 = 1).
2 Pick uniformly at random a prime q ∈ P /2,β 1 . 
Wiener's Attack
The idea behind Wiener's attack on RSA with small secret-exponent d is that for small d, the publicly known fraction e/N is a very good approximation to the secret fraction k/d (here k = (ed − 1)/φ), and hence k/d can be found from the convergents of the continued-fraction expansion of e/N , using the results of Section 2.1.
WienAtk(N, e): Wiener Attack Algorithm
1 Compute the continued fraction convergents
N using the algorithm of Theorem 2.1.
Return
We say that algorithm WienAtk succeeds on input (N, e) if it outputs
To obtain Wiener's sufficient condition for the success of algorithm WienAtk, we observe that, from the equation ed − 1 = kφ it follows that the approximation error of k/d by e/N is given by:
The last bound uses the fact that s < 2 /2+1 since p and q are not even. Note also that 
. This immediately gives us the following result due to Wiener [10] . 
Theorem 3.1 (WienAtk Sufficient Condition). Suppose that the key-generation parameters
(δ, β 1 , β 2 , ) satisfy the condition δ < 1/4 − β 1 + 1 . Then on input (N, e), where (N, e, d) = RSAKG δ,β 1 ,β 2 ( ),
A Converse to Wiener's Result
The following statement is our necessary condition for success of Wiener's algorithm. It shows that whenever δ exceeds the Wiener sufficiency threshold 1/4 by any positive constant , the Wiener attack algorithm succeeds with negligible probability 2 −c· for some constant c > 0. Proof. By definition, if WienAtk succeeds on input (N, e), then one of the convergents
Using d > 2 δ· −β 2 and δ = 1/4 + , we obtain the necessary success condition
We now show that, for any > 0, the probability that (5) holds is negligible over the random choice of d ∈ D ,δ,β 2 (φ). We first reduce the problem to upper bounding the probability that e N is negligibly small. 
d·s , and using
for positive constants c 2 = 2 max(c 1 , 2 β+1+β 2 ) and η 2 = min(η 1 , 1/2 + δ), as claimed. 
To bound Pr
Proof [9] ) and interchanging the order of summation, we obtain the Legendre formula
Observe that
and recall that the Möbius function satisfies 
We now observe that φ = Θ(2 ) so 2
for some positive constant c 5 . Furthermore, it is known [7] that φ ϕ(φ) = O(log log φ) = O(2 log log ). Plugging these results in (7) and using the fact that 2 c 5 log = o 2 δ· −log log we obtain the claimed result #M = Ω 2 (δ− log log )· .
Using Lemma 4.1 and the fact that d is chosen uniformly at random from the set D ,δ,β 2 (φ), we conclude that WienAtk's success probability p is upper bounded as p ≤ It follows that there exists a constant 0 such that p ≤ 2 −c· for all ≥ 0 , where c = η 2 /2 > 0. This completes the proof of the theorem.
A Converse Result for Improved Variants of Wiener Attack
Since Wiener's attack fails as soon as δ > 1/4, it is natural to investigate improved variants of the Wiener attack which may succeed even in this case. In particular, Verheul and Van Tilborg (VVT) [8] , and more recently Dujella [3] , presented improved variants of Wiener's attack which are guaranteed to succeed even when δ > 1/4. However, the run-time of these attacks when δ = 1/4 + (for some positive constant ) is exponential in · , so these attacks are asymptotically slower than the generic attack of factoring the RSA modulus, which runs in subexponential time. As we explain below, both the VVT and Dujella attacks can be viewed as members of a natural class of extensions of the Wiener attack (which are all guaranteed to succeed when δ > 1/4), which we call the Wiener Search Variant (WSV) class of attacks (essentially, a WSV attack searches an interval near the known fraction e/N for the secret fraction k/d -see below for a precise definition). It is interesting to ask whether one can substantially improve on the VVT and Dujella attacks -in particular: does there exist an attack in the WSV class which has subexponential run-time? In this section, we answer this question in the negative by proving the following 'converse' result: For any attack algorithm in the WSV class and any subexponential run-time bound T , the probability (over the random choices of the key generation algorithm RSAKG) that the attack halts with success after a run-time less than T is negligible whenever δ = 1/4 + for any constant > 0. Thus there are no WSV attacks which are asymptotically faster than factoring (and hence the VVT and Dujella attacks are optimal in the sense that all WSV attacks must have at least exponential run-time).
The Wiener Search Variant (WSV) Attack Class.
Recall that the central idea behind Wiener's attack is that the public fraction e/N is a good approximation to the secret fraction k/d. Indeed, when δ < 1/4 − , k/d is the best approximation to e/N among all fractions with denominator at most d (see Theorem 2.2), and Wiener's continued fractions attack efficiently finds this best approximation. Our converse result in the previous section shows that when δ > 1/4, k/d is likely to no longer be the best approximation to e/N in the set of all fractions with denominator at most d, but it is still likely to be a good approximation. So, a natural extension of the Wiener attack is to search through the set of fractions with denominator less than 2 δ· (and greater than 2 δ· −β 2 ) in an interval close to e/N , until k/d is found. This leads to the following definition. 
Enumerate a set S(N, e) of approximations to k d , where S(N, e) is guaranteed to contain the set S(N, e) of all fractions
k d in the interval [ e N , k d ] with denominator d ∈ [2 δ· −β 2 , 2 δ· ].
Return a list containing all elements of the set S(N, e).
We note that the above definition gives rise to a class of attacks, since it allows any choice for the set S(N, e) (subject to the constraint that S (N, e) contains S(N, e) ). As in the case of the original Wiener attack, we say that a WSV attack succeeds if it outputs a set of approximations S(N, e) which contains the desired secret fraction k/d. From the definition, it is in fact clear that any WSV attack succeeds with probability 1 because of the requirement that S(N, e) ⊇ S(N, e) and the fact that k/d ∈ S(N, e). The central question is, therefore, how large is the running-time of the attack for δ = 1/4 + . The running-time depends on the size of the set S(N, e) output by the attack, and on the efficiency by which the elements of S(N, e) are enumerated.
Known WSV Attacks. The VVT [8] and Dujella [3] attacks are both members of the WSV class. Let δ = 1/4 + with > 0. In the VVT attack [8] , it is shown, using continued fraction techniques, how to enumerate a set of approximations S V V T (N, e) (containing S(N, e) as defined in Def. 5.1) of size (N, e) ), where the integer A is proportional to certain coefficients in the continued fraction expansion of e/N and heuristically expected to be small with high probability. The Dujella attack [3] improves on the VVT attack by using results from diophantine approximation to enumerate a smaller set #S Duj (N, e) (containing S(N, e) ) of size (N, e) ), where the integer A is the same as in the VVT attack. Moreover, Dujella proves that #S Duj (N, e) = O( · 2 2 · ).
Our Result: A Lower Bound on WSV Attack Running-Time. The known WSV attacks have exponential run-times for δ = 1/4 + with > 0. We now address the following question: Does there exist a WSV attack with subexponential run-time for δ = 1/4 + ? The following result shows that the answer is no. Therefore, the WSV class does not contain an attack faster than factoring. Proof. The set S(N, e) output by A δ,β 2 , is guaranteed by Def. 5.1 to contain the set S(N, e), where
and for any m > 0, we denote by F m the Farey set of order m which consists of all rational numbers
is certainly lower bounded as T A = Ω(# S (N, e) ). To prove the theorem, it therefore suffices to show that for any subexponential bound T = 2 g( ) with g( ) = o( ), there exist positive constants c and
We will first reduce this problem to several simpler problems. To do so, we introduce the following definitions. For an element
e. the largest element of F 2 δ· \ F 2 δ· −β 2 which is strictly less than k d . We will be interested in elements
We now have the following result.
where
Proof. For a positive integer i, let 
and hence that
It follows that there exists r * ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} such that
where, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
and
where the last inequality follows because the probability that Let us now apply Lemma 5.1 with the parameter ∆ min = 2 −(1/2+η 2 )· for some positive constant η 2 such that η 2 < 2 · (recall that δ = 1/4 + ), and upper bound each of the terms on the right-hand side of (9) . First, combining Lemmas 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 from the proof of Theorem 4.1, we conclude that there exists a positive constant c 3 such that
Next, we upper bound # S * δ,β 2 , ∆ min T . Let us define n = 2 δ· = 2 (1/4+ )· . Then we have, using (1) , that there exist positive constants and 0 such that
where we have used the fact that 0 < η 2 < 2 to obtain the last inequality.
The following lemma shows that 'large' gaps (exponentially larger than n −2 ) between adjacent elements of the set F n \ F n/2 β 2 are very 'rare' (negligible fraction).
Lemma 5.2. Fix positive constants β 2 , ν, and δ. For any n = 2 δ· , and any ν > ν we have
Proof. The algorithm RSAKG always generates k and d such that gcd(k, d) = 1 and 
We now upper bound each of the two probabilities in the right-hand side of (17). First we upper bound the probability
To do so, observe that for any fixed φ in the support of φ and any fixed d ∈ Z Z we have
for some fixed p = O n
) , using Lemma 4.3. Letting Φ denote the set of φ in the support
where we used (18) to get the inequality in the fourth line.
Now recall that φ = (p−1)·(q −1). So, for any φ < 2 , we have using the uniform distribution of (p, q) in P 2 , where τ ( φ) denotes the total number of divisors of φ. It is known (see Theorem 317 of [4] ) that τ ( φ) = O 2 2 log( φ)/ log log( φ) = O(n c 2 / log ) for some positive constant c 2 , using the fact that 2 /4 < φ < 2 . Also, from the prime number theorem (see 
Using the bounds from Lemma 5.3 and (21) and the fact that T = 2 g( ) with g( )/ = o(1), we get, for some positive constant that
Finally, plugging in the bounds from (14) and (22) into (9), we conclude that there exist positive constants c and 0 such that (8) holds. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Conclusions
We obtained converse results to the Wiener attack on low secret-exponent RSA and its extensions. 
